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Strengthening European identity is often considered as one of the mechanisms to
address the perceived lack of legitimacy of the European Union (EU). In this study we
test the explanatory power of cognitive mobilization for the development of European
identity (more knowledge about the EU leads to a stronger European identity) and we
challenge this model by the inclusion of both an economic utilitarian explanation for
European identity (benefiting more from EU integration leads to a stronger European
identity) and a political trust approach (having more political trust leads to a stronger
European identity). The multilevel regression analysis on the International Civic and
Citizenship Education Study 2009 data, which is collected among adolescents in 21
member states, shows that knowledge about the EU has a significant but limited effect
on European identity. Personal economic benefits because of EU membership and
having trust in national political institutions, in contrast, are more important
determinants for the development of European identity.
Keywords: European identity; European Union; International Civics and Citizenship
Education Study 2009; political knowledge; economic utilitarianism; political trust
Introduction
One of the perennial problems of the European Union (EU) is its alleged lack of
democratic legitimacy (Hobolt 2012; Scharpf 2009). This lack of legitimacy expresses
itself in a low voter turnout for European elections and a prevailing Eurosceptic climate in
a number of member states (Leconte 2010). This lack of legitimacy has been related to
the fact that European identity is but weakly developed (Habermas 2011). For most
inhabitants of the EU, the sense of belonging to a community of European citizens is less
than salient, and this also means that EU citizens do not have the feeling that the EU truly
represents their common interests. Both in European policy documents and in the
academic literature it is often assumed that more and more adequate knowledge about the
EU could serve as a mechanism to strengthen European identity. This cognitive
mobilization mechanism suggests that a higher level of knowledge about the EU will
be associated with higher levels of European identity. As citizens gain more knowledge
about the goals and the functioning of the EU, it is assumed that they will identify more
strongly with the community of European citizens (Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001;
Faas 2007; Inglehart 1970; Philippou, Keating, and Ortloff 2009; Thorpe 2008). It is
expected that the more familiar citizens are with the way the EU functions, the closer they
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will feel related to this level of political decision-making. However, the empirical merits
of this hypothesis about the cognitive development of European identity have not yet
been investigated in a comprehensive manner among the group that is targeted most
frequently by this kind of information: adolescents. Both the EU itself and a variety of
school systems devote a considerable amount of resources on targeting adolescents with
information about the EU, and one of the goals of this effort is to strengthen the
legitimacy of European integration (Keating 2009). Whether this objective is actually
realized, therefore, remains to be investigated.
If we want to determine the impact of knowledge on European identity in a
methodologically valid manner, it is important to include other possible determinants of
identity into the analysis as well. Therefore, in this article two competing theoretical
claims will simultaneously be put to the test, in order to assess in a correct manner
whether knowledge about the EU contributes to the development of a European identity.
More specifically, we also test the economic utilitarian approach and the political trust
model. From the theory on economic utilitarianism it is hypothesized that identity will be
related to a sense of benefits derived from EU membership. Those that stand to gain from
further European integration will develop a stronger sense of European identity than those
who actually lose out as a result of the process of European integration (Jiménez et al.
2004; Kritzinger 2005). The political trust model assumes that citizens perceive the EU as
an institution that was conceived and is directed mainly by the political elites of the
member states (Anderson 1998). Citizens expressing a high level of trust in the political
institutions of their own country are, therefore, also more likely to develop a stronger
European identity.
We use a large-scale comparative European survey among adolescents to test the
potential of these explanations for European identity. We opt for this approach because
adolescents are systematically exposed to information about the functioning of the
European institutions at school (Philippou, Keating, and Ortloff 2009). This implies that
among this group that is still enrolled in the school system, we can test the impact of
knowledge in an ideal setting as basically the school system decides whether they will be
exposed to knowledge about the EU or not. Also, social identity is mainly developed at
an early age and crystallizes during mid-adolescence (Meeus et al. 2010). By studying
14-year-old respondents, we study the development of European identity right at the
phase in life when this process is taking place.
In this article, we briefly review the literature on cognitive mobilization, economic
utilitarianism, and political trust in their relationship with European identity. Subse-
quently we present data, methods, and the results of the multilevel analysis.
Knowledge and European identity
First, it is important to define the theoretical concept of European identity. European
identity can be conceptualized as the inclusion of the European policy level in the social
identity of an individual (Herrmann and Brewer 2004). A social identity consists of
different overlapping layers of identification with the social groups one is part of (Tajfel
1981). This concept of social identity implies that one is both conscious about a group
membership (cognitive aspect) and that one attaches a positive affective value to this
group membership (emotional aspect). For the EU this means that individuals with a
sense of European identity are aware that they are part of the group of European citizens
(cognitive aspect) and that they attach positive emotional value to this group membership.
One can identify with numerous social groups (e.g. based on gender, occupation, religion,
2 S. Verhaegen and M. Hooghe
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nationality) and all these aspects of one’s social identity can be combined. One’s national
identity can, for instance, intersect or interact with one’s European identity and it depends
on the specific interaction context which identity is experienced as most salient (Sen
2006; Fligstein 2008; Risse 2010). Numerous authors have stated that the development of
a common European identity is crucial to lay the foundations for a fully legitimate and
robust democratic EU (Ehin 2008; Føllesdal 2006). Jürgen Habermas (2011) is among the
most vocal advocates of the claim that this sense of shared identity is the most important
alternative for a bureaucratic and sometimes even undemocratic process of European
integration. If the EU wants to evolve toward a truly democratic institution, it needs to
represent a European community of citizens and this is only possible when there is a
sense of common belonging among all citizens of the EU, which according to Habermas
is almost inevitably built on a European identity. Furthermore, recent findings have
shown that citizens also attach different meanings to this group membership. A
distinction is routinely made between civic and cultural conceptualizations of European
identity (Bruter 2003, 2008; Delanty 2002; Fligstein et al. 2012). For citizens who
conceptualize European identity as civic form of identity, being a European citizen means
to be part of a political community with political institutions, with a system of rights and
duties for the individual citizens. A cultural European identity, on the other hand, means
sharing a common history, values, and cultural traits among the European citizens. The
theory of cognitive mobilization that we will put to the test in this paper, however, does
not propose any expectations about the impact of knowledge about the EU on the specific
meaning attached to European identity. The existing literature only deals with the strength
of identity and not with the question whether a civic or a cultural conceptualization is
predominant. In the current study we therefore only focus on the strength of European
identity.
Second, there is a strong ongoing debate about the question whether the transfer of
knowledge can lead to a stronger European identity. The EU itself assumes that citizens
will feel closer to the European ideals if they receive adequate information about the
functioning of the EU institutions (Directorate-General for Communication 2011). In the
academic literature, the importance of this cognitive mechanism is also routinely
highlighted. Most of the literature departs from Inglehart’s theory of cognitive
mobilization which argues that citizens who know more about the EU have a stronger
European identity because: “One must become aware of it [the European Union] before
one can develop a sense of commitment” (Inglehart 1970, 47). Citizens with these
cognitive skills are expected to be better capable to deal with a rather distant and abstract
community such as the EU. This reasoning would imply that there has to be a cognitive
basis for the development of a European identity. Indeed, a defining characteristic of a
social identity is that there has to be some level of consciousness about being part of a
specific social group. While Inglehart (1970, 56) aimed to learn more about the
development of European identity, he however only tested the explanatory power of
cognitive mobilization for support for European integration and not for European identity.
Most research testing the merits of cognitive mobilization subsequently also focused
solely on support for European integration (see e.g. Janssen 1991; Stoeckel 2012). As
recent studies tend to distinguish more strictly between measures of support for European
integration and European identity (Beaudonnet and Di Mauro 2012; Cram 2012), the few
studies concerning European identity which include references to the importance of
knowledge about the EU are highly relevant for our current study. Faas (2007) and
Thorpe (2008), for instance, found a positive relationship between knowledge about the
EU and European identity among adolescents. However, these studies are qualitative
Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research 3
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studies based on the experiences of a limited number of adolescents in only one or a few
member states. One notable study moving beyond this scope is the work of Juan Díez
Medrano and Paula Gutiérrez (2001) who tested the theory of cognitive mobilization for
the explanation of European identity using a large-scale (adult) survey in Spain. They
confirm that cognitive mobilization explains the strength of European identity of citizens
in a similar way as it explains the attitude support for European integration. An important
limitation of this study, however, is that cognitive mobilization is operationalized as
media use and educational level, while Inglehart already concluded in his article that a
test of objective knowledge is the preferred method of operationalization (Inglehart 1970,
54). The current study builds on these insights and aims to validate them by testing the
theory of cognitive mobilization among adolescents in a broad sample of member states
by using a large-scale quantitative analysis and by using objective knowledge about the
EU as a more direct measurement of cognitive mobilization. The International Civic and
Citizenship Education Study 2009 (ICCS 2009) data allow for such a large-scale
quantitative analysis. Such research allows for the identification of a relationship between
knowledge and European identity, where we follow cognitive approaches that assume a
causal relationship between knowledge and identity.
The first hypothesis of this article therefore is:
More knowledge about the European Union leads to a stronger European identity.
Alternative approaches: economic utilitarianism and political trust
If we want to assess the validity of the cognitive model, however, it is also important to
include competing approaches in the analysis. The model of economic utilitarianism
departs from self-interest. Actors are assumed to base their judgment and identification
with the EU community on a rational cost–benefit calculation about the economic
benefits or costs of European membership (Cinnirella 1997; Fligstein, Polyakova, and
Sandholtz 2012; Kritzinger 2005; Verhaegen, Hooghe, and Quintelier 2014). In this view,
citizens will identify more easily with the EU if the rational cost–benefit analysis they
make results in a positive outcome. More precisely, it has been shown that for European
identity – in contrast to support for European integration – only perceived economic
benefits and objective measures measured on the individual level are important for the
explanation of this form of identity (Verhaegen, Hooghe, and Quintelier 2014). This can
be understood by the observation that identity also has an emotional element next to a
cognitive element, rendering it more personal than the attitudinal variable of support for
European integration. The theory of economic utilitarianism will be operationalized in
line with these previous results. Moreover, this process of economic utilitarian concerns
leading to the development of a European identity follows the neo-functionalist logic that
more intense European cooperation will lead to substantial economic benefits, thus
strengthening loyalty to the project of European integration (Haas 1958, 2001). If we
want to test the validity of a cognitive development of European identity, it is therefore
necessary to also include these economic considerations into the model as a competing
explanation for European identity. Consequently, the second hypothesis of this article
is that:
Citizens who obtain more economic benefits because of EU membership will develop a
stronger European identity.
4 S. Verhaegen and M. Hooghe
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We also include the level of trust in the national political institutions in the analysis.
Political trust is trust in “the core institutions of the state, including the legislature,
executive, and judicial branches of government” (Norris 2011, 29). This means that this
definition of political trust does not reflect trust in specific office holders at a certain point
in time, but it reflects trust in the institutions in general (Zmerli and Hooghe 2011). Only
a limited number of studies in the field of the EU have focused on political trust so far
(Arnold, Sapir, and Zapryanova 2012).
According to proponents of this model, citizens of the member states identify more
strongly as Europeans when they trust their own national political institutions. A citizen
who trusts political institutions expects that these institutions will act according to the
norms and principles that are prevailing within the community (Anderson 1998; Norris
2011). National political institutions are expected to play a role in the development of
European identity because of their function as guardians of the shared norms and values
within the community (Kaina 2006). From the definition of European identity as an
aspect of one’s social identity, we derive that citizens with a European identity feel part of
a political community, the EU. This means that they identify with a wider group of
European citizens who are expected to share the same norms and values. As in the large
community of EU citizens interaction with a large proportion of fellow citizens is not
likely to occur, citizens have to rely on the fact that they are governed by political
institutions that have agreed upon a set of shared norms and values they believe in within
the larger European society. Therefore, we expect that citizens who trust the national
political institutions will develop a stronger European identity. These national institutions
engaged their member state in European integration and play an important role in the
development of and in guarding the norms and values within the EU community. This
proposed mechanism follows a functional reasoning about trust, assuming that trust is
built on expectations. These expectations help to reduce the complexity of social
interaction and are built on common values and norms. Accordingly, we argue that first a
relation of trust needs to be established with the (national) political institutions citizens
are familiar with, and subsequently these expectations are transferred to an identification
with the European community the political institutions engaged in. As a third hypothesis
we therefore state that:
There is a positive relation between trust in national political institutions and the
development of a European identity.
Data and methods
The data in this article are derived from the ICCS 2009 that was conducted in 21 member
states of the EU (Schulz, Ainley, and Fraillon 2009). The ICCS questionnaire includes
extensive information on various topics of citizenship education. The International
Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement conducted the study and
national research agencies cooperated within the framework of this international
organization to conduct research about educational outcomes. The data were collected
in 2009 among 70,502 pupils in 21 European member states with an average age of
14.4.1 Earlier research has established that at this age political attitudes and preferences
can be measured in a valid manner (van Deth, Abendschön, and Vollmar 2011). Meeus
et al. (2010) showed that social identities develop at an early age and crystallize during
mid-adolescence, so we study the explanatory value of different theoretical approaches at
a time when the development of European identity is taking place. The adolescents filled
Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research 5
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out a self-administered questionnaire at school and each time the whole class was
surveyed. At least 150 schools were selected in each country, using a random sample
proportional to school size, with an inclusion of all education tracks. The aim was to
question 3000 pupils in each member state. The average response in the countries
included in this article was, after replacement, 89.5% and it has to be remembered in this
regard that the survey in most countries was conducted by the educational authorities
themselves which contributed to the willingness of school principals to participate in the
study.
The ICCS data contain sufficient indicators for knowledge about the EU, as well as
for European identity, political trust, and economic benefits to investigate the relationship
between these variables. As the 70,502 respondents in this study are nested within 21
European member states, we will use a multilevel model with random intercepts that
takes individual and country specific information into account.
Operationalization
European identity
The survey data allow us to operationalize European identity. In line with Tajfel’s
definition of social identity, Weiler (1997) stated that a European identity is based on “the
individual’s sentiments of belonging to the Union” (Weiler 1997, 500). It is thus not
sufficient that a citizen is aware of belonging to the EU; citizens also have to express a
positive emotional attachment to it. We therefore use measures of both cognitive and
emotional identification as a European citizen. First, the cognitive element of awareness
to belong to the group of European citizens is measured in the data-set as feeling part of
the EU. This measure of self-categorization is a common measure for identity (Citrin and
Sides 2004; Quintelier and Dejaeghere 2008; Risse 2010). Second, the statement “I am
proud to be a member of the EU” measures the emotional dimension of European
identity. We measure the positive emotional value attached to being a European citizen as
this is in line with social identity theory which argues that positive emotional value
should be attached to a group membership in order for an individual to include this in
one’s social identity (Tajfel 1981). We therefore expect that the statements “I am proud to
live in Europe,” “I feel part of Europe,” “I am proud that my country is a member of the
European Union,” and “I feel part of the EU” from the ICCS 2009 survey will measure
European identity in a comprehensive way (Levine and Thompson 2004). The
respondents could express their agreement with these statements on a 4-point Likert
scale. The principal component analysis (Table 1) shows that this theoretical expectation
is also empirically confirmed: all four items clearly load on the same latent factor, so they
can be considered as a valid operationalization of European identity (Eigenvalue: 2.536;
explained variance: 63.4%). The results of this factor scale will be used as the dependent
variable in the analyses.
Cognitive mobilization
An extensive battery of knowledge questions about the EU (19 questions) was included
in the ICCS (Kerr et al. 2009). Typical questions were about the meeting place of the
European Parliament, the enlargement of the EU, and European competences. The
answers to the multiple-choice questions were binary recoded as answered false or true
and a score between 0 and 19 was calculated as a measure for “knowledge about the
European Union” (see Appendix 1 for the exact wording of the questions). This cognitive
6 S. Verhaegen and M. Hooghe
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test (Table 2) shows that the knowledge level among the respondents is quite high, with
an average score of 12.4 on 19. Respondents from new member states Poland and
Slovakia seem to be the best informed, while we measure the lowest score in the English
education system. Earlier findings suggested that there is a difference in political
knowledge between girls and boys (Hooghe, Quintelier, and Reeskens, 2007; Mondak
and Anderson 2004). In this research we find a significant (p < 0.001), though small
difference between an average score of 12.6 on 19 for boys and 12.3 for girls.
Economic utilitarianism
Following the suggestions made in previous studies about economic utilitarianism in the
EU, we include individual-level variables measuring perceived and objective economic
Table 1. Factor analysis European identity.
European identity
I am proud to live in Europe 0.797
I feel part of Europe 0.829
I am proud that my country is a member of the EU 0.781
I feel part of the EU 0.779
Note: N = 52,478. Principal component analysis. Cronbach’s α: 0.806. Eigenvalue: 2.539. Explained variance:
63.5%.
Source: ICCS 2009.
Table 2. Mean score on 19 knowledge questions per member state.
Country Mean SD
England 11.03 2.60
Spain 11.16 2.40
Greece 11.87 2.65
Luxembourg 11.93 2.47
Malta 12.08 2.68
Latvia 12.09 2.38
Ireland 12.20 2.58
Cyprus 12.22 2.44
Belgium 12.26 2.32
Slovenia 12.28 2.28
Italy 12.31 2.48
Austria 12.39 2.64
Sweden 12.54 2.63
Finland 12.59 2.37
Estonia 12.77 2.19
Lithuania 12.84 2.38
Bulgaria 12.91 2.43
Czech Republic 12.93 2.20
Denmark 13.05 2.43
Slovakia 13.26 2.59
Poland 13.78 2.37
Total average 12.43 2.53
Note: N = 62,112. Numbers are mean scores (0–19) and standard deviations (SDs).
Source: ICCS 2009.
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benefits (Verhaegen, Hooghe, and Quintelier 2014). To measure perceived economic
benefits of European integration, the ICCS 2009 data-set includes three statements about
the economic merits of financial integration. These three survey items load on one
underlying factor: perceived economic benefits. The principal component factor analysis
is presented in Table 3. The Cronbach’s α of 0.720 indicates that these items form a
reliable and internally consistent scale.
The expected educational level of the adolescent can be used as a proxy for objective
economic benefits, because citizens with a higher educational level tend to benefit more
from economic integration (Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011; Serricchio, Tsakatika, and
Quaglia 2013). As the respondents are still enrolled in secondary school, we do not know
what the final educational level of the respondents will be. However, the survey did probe
about the educational level the respondents expected to reach in the future. Response
options were lower secondary school, upper secondary school, nontertiary post-secondary
or vocational tertiary education, and having finished theoretically oriented tertiary studies
or a postgraduate degree. Previous research has shown that the expected educational level
of adolescents is widely applied as a proxy indicator for academic orientation (Andrew
and Hauser 2012).
Political trust
In the ICCS 2009 national political trust was measured as trust in local and national
political institutions. The question posed for the four institutions in Table 4 was: “How
much do you trust each of the following institutions?” The response options were:
“completely,” “quite a lot,” “a little,” and “not at all.” The principal component analysis
shows that trust in political institutions forms one latent concept (Hooghe 2011). The
Table 3. Factor analysis perceived economic benefits.
Perceived economic
benefits
If all European countries had the same currency, they would be
economically stronger.
0.786
There are more advantages to joining a common currency, such as the
Euro, than there are disadvantages.
0.803
All countries in Europe should join the Euro. 0.818
Note: N = 52,478. Principal component analysis. Cronbach’s α: 0.720. Eigenvalue: 1.931. Explained variance:
64.4%. Response options: strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), agree (3), and strongly agree (4).
Source: ICCS 2009.
Table 4. Factor analysis for trust in political institutions.
Trust in political institutions
Trust in national government 0.829
Trust in local government 0.724
Trust in political parties 0.817
Trust in national parliament 0.839
Note: N = 52,478. Cronbach’s α: 0.817. Principal component analysis. Eigenvalue: 2.582. Explained variance:
64.6%.
Source: ICCS 2009.
8 S. Verhaegen and M. Hooghe
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Cronbach’s α of 0.817 demonstrates that these items are a reliable measure for trust in
political institutions.
Control variables
Furthermore, in the model we include a number of control variables, both at the
individual level and at the country level. At the individual level, we first control for the
expectation of a strong correlation between political interest, socioeconomic status, and
political knowledge (Eveland and Scheufele 2000). Politically interested adolescents are
more likely to acquire knowledge about the EU (Prior 2010). To measure political
interest, we use the factor scale presented in Table 5.2 The items, measured by a 4-point
Likert scale, probed about the interest of the respondents in a wide range of political and
social issues. The factor analysis shows that these items form a highly reliable indicator
for interest in political and social problems (Eigenvalue: 3.257; explained variance:
65.1%; Cronbach’s α: 0.866). In general, we can expect that socioeconomic status will be
strongly related to knowledge, and this also holds for knowledge about the EU (Faas
2007; Thorpe 2008; Agirdag, Huyst, and Van Houtte 2012). Respondents were also asked
about the educational level of their parents. The variables “educational level of the father”
and “educational level of the mother” correlated strongly (Pearson’s correlation = 0.581),
so we combined both measurements in a sum scale. This variable taps into the
socioeconomic status of the family in which the adolescent grows up.
Other commonly used control variables in this field are age, gender, and origin. We
cannot take up age as a variable since respondents were selected on the class level, and
thus all have more or less the same age. The variable gender is adopted in the data-set as a
binary variable, with boys coded as 0 and girls as 1. Adolescents born outside the EU are
expected to have a weaker European identity than adolescents born inside the EU
(Agirdag, Huyst, and Van Houtte 2012). The ICCS data, however, do not allow making
this distinction as the survey did not ask about the specific country of birth. Pupils were
only asked whether they and their parents were born in the country where they were
surveyed. Using this information we can divide the respondents into three groups: native
citizens, immigrants (who were not born in the country where they were surveyed), and
second-generation citizens (who were born in the country where they were surveyed but
that have at least one parent that was not born in this country). These groups are included
in the analysis as dummy variables with native citizens as the reference category.
On the country level, we control for the moment of accession to the EU of the
member state and for the aggregated level of Euroscepticism. Since some previous studies
observed different levels of European identity in older and newer member states, we
Table 5. Factor analysis political interest.
Political interest
Interest in political issues in community 0.773
Interest in political issues in country 0.862
Interest in social issues in country 0.796
Interest in politics in other countries 0.785
Interest in international politics 0.815
Note: N = 52,478. Principal component analysis. Cronbach’s α: 0.866. Eigenvalue: 3.256. Explained variance:
65.1%.
Source: ICCS 2009.
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control for the moment of accession of each member state. Risse (2010) concluded that
European identification in the newer member states from Central and Eastern Europe is
lower than in the older member states because length of EU membership matters in the
development of a European identity. Although there is no linear relation between how
long a country has been a member state and the strength of European identification,
citizens of new member states tend to feel less European according to this study. In line
with previous research, we split up the member states into three categories to test this
relationship (Gabel 1998; L. Hooghe and Marks 2005; Risse 2010). The founding
members (Treaty of Rome in 1957) serve as the reference category, with a second group
that joined the EU between 1973 and 1995 and a third group that joined between 2004
and 2007.3 Finally, we control for the level of Euroscepticism within each member state.
Faas (2007) found that the relationship between knowledge and European identity might
vary, depending on the dominant framing of the EU within the public opinion of a
member state. Accordingly, we include an aggregate measure of Euroscepticism based on
the question in Eurobarometer 72.4 (2009) whether respondents perceive the EU
membership of their country as “a good thing,” “neither a good nor a bad thing,” or “a
bad thing” in order to assess in a more general manner the prevailing attitude toward
Europe. In the construction of our scale we attributed the value 0 to the answer that
membership is “a good thing,” 0.5 to “neither a good nor a bad thing,” and 1 to “a bad
thing” (Lubbers and Scheepers 2005). By multiplying these values with the proportion of
respondents in each member state that chose this response option and adding them, we
obtained an aggregated measurement for the mean level of Euroscepticism in each
member state. Descriptives of all included variables are presented in Appendix 2.
Results
Given that our dependent variable “European identity” is continuous, we can run a linear
regression with independent variables on two levels. Adolescents (N = 52,478) are nested
in member states (N = 21), so we built a two-level multilevel model with random
intercepts to account for the clustering (Hox 2010). The analysis was carried out in two
steps. In Model 1 we only take the explanatory variables to test the cognitive, economic
utilitarian, and trust approach into account. The control variables both at the individual
level and at the country level are added in Model 2.
When we run the null model (Table 6) we can observe that a significant proportion of
variance in European identity is situated at the country level. The intra-cluster correlation
(ICC) is 5.1%. The likelihood-ratio test shows that the inclusion of the country level is a
significant improvement to the model in comparison to a single-level regression model.
The variance located at this level indicates that levels of European identity are to some
extent clustered within member states. Figure 1 visualizes this spread in the average level
of European identity. It is therefore necessary to include country-level variables.
Model 1 shows the multilevel model with the explanatory variables only. First, we
take a look at the overall impact of the inclusion of these variables. The log-likelihood
drops from the null model to Model 1, showing that the inclusion of these variables is an
improvement for the model fit. The explanatory variables also explain an important
proportion of the variance in European identity between adolescents as the unexplained
variance e(ij) drops from 0.914 to 0.801. We use the “approximate R2” as calculated in
Hox (2010) as a measure for explained variance. The included variables in Model 1
explain 12.3% of the individual-level variance. Second, we look at the explanatory
variables. As we aim to compare the importance of each theoretical explanation for the
10 S. Verhaegen and M. Hooghe
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [K
U 
Le
uv
en
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
7:3
7 1
8 M
arc
h 2
01
5 
Table 6. Multilevel Regression model for European identity.
Null model Model 1: explanatory variables Model 2: full model
B SE β B SE β B SE β
Intercept 0.031 0.049 0.009 −0.260*** 0.044 0.008 0.165 0.116 0.085
EU knowledge 0.016*** 0.002 0.040*** 0.011*** 0.002 0.027***
Perceived economic benefits 0.236*** 0.004 0.239*** 0.231*** 0.004 0.234***
Expected educational level 0.030*** 0.004 0.030*** 0.023*** 0.004 0.024***
Political trust 0.227*** 0.004 0.230*** 0.203*** 0.004 0.205***
Gender (female = 1) −0.042*** 0.008 −0.042***
Political interest 0.083*** 0.004 0.084***
Parental education 0.003 0.004 0.003
Origin (ref. native)
Second generation −0.085*** 0.012 −0.086***
Immigrant −0.174*** 0.018 −0.176***
Country variables
Accession (ref. 1957)
Accessed 1973–1995 −0.003 0.101 −0.003
Accessed 2004–2007 −0.055 0.099 −0.055
Euroscepticism −0.934** 0.334 −0.089**
e(ij) 0.914 0.006 0.936 0.801 0.005 0.821 0.793 0.005 0.813
u(0j) 0.050 0.015 0.051 0.031 0.010 0.031 0.021 0.006 0.021
ICC 5.1% 5.1% 3.7% 3.7% 2.5% 2.5%
LL −72153 −72787 −68693 −69327 −68431 −69064
R2 (individual level) 12.3% 13.2%
Note: N (individual level) = 52,478; n (country level) = 21 for all models, after listwise deletion. Standardized β coefficients are calculated for all variables, except for dummy
variables.
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01.
Source: ICCS 2009.
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development of a European identity, standardized β coefficients are presented in Table 6
so that we can compare the strength of the relationships. The main explanatory variable
knowledge about the EU is significantly (p < 0.001) positively related to European
identity. We see that although it is significant, the β coefficient of EU knowledge is rather
limited (β = 0.040). The analysis shows that knowing more about the EU and having a
stronger European identity are related, but this is a rather weak relationship. The two
indicators for the economic utilitarian approach are significantly positively related to
European identity as well, as expected. The more adolescents perceive that it is
economically beneficial for member states to join the Eurozone, the stronger their
European identity is. Also a higher expected education outcome is positively related to
European identity. Especially the effect of perceived economic benefits on European
identity is very strong (β = 0.239; p < 0.001), as compared to the effect of knowledge
about the EU. The economic utilitarian approach is thus a much better explanation for
European identity than cognitive mobilization. The trust model as well shows a strong
positive relationship with European identity (β = 0.230; p < 0.001). The more one has
trust in national political institutions, the more one identifies as European. Thus, the
political trust approach receives much more support than the cognitive approach as well.
Among the control variables, we find a few variables that are strongly related to
European identity. The control variables are included in Model 2. As expected, we see a
drop in unexplained variance at both the individual level and the country level again. The
stepwise inclusion (not shown in the models) of individual-level control variables in a
first step and country-level variables in a second step shows that the drop in unexplained
variance at the country level from 0.031 to 0.021 is indeed caused by the inclusion of the
country-level controls. The drop in unexplained variance at the individual level is caused
by the inclusion of individual-level controls. The inclusion of these control variables in
the analysis causes only small decreases in the coefficients of the explanatory variables as
0
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Figure 1. Country residuals and 95% confidence intervals for European identity in the null model.
Note: N = 53,886.
Source: ICCS 2009.
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compared to Model 1. The found relationships are thus robust. Except for the moment of
accession and the parental education which are not significant, all control variables
behave as expected. For the individual controls we see that girls have a slightly weaker
European identity than boys, adolescents that are more interested in political and social
matters tend to feel more European and non-native adolescents tend to have a weaker
European identity. The effect is stronger for adolescents that have experienced migrating
to a different country themselves, in comparison to adolescents that are second-generation
immigrants. The country-level control variable Euroscepticism shows that adolescents
that grow up in a member state where citizens are more Eurosceptic than average feel less
European than their counterparts in more pro-European member states.
Finally, we decided not to include random coefficients in the model since our research
question and theoretical assumptions do not require these tests. To assess the robustness
of the results, we did check for the variance (random coefficients) between member states
for the relation between knowledge about the EU and European identity. However, the
variance (0.3%) was not of substantive magnitude.
Discussion
The analyses show that all three theories tested can explain part of the development of a
stronger European identity among adolescents. All three hypotheses are thus confirmed,
but these results need some qualification. When testing the cognitive mobilization model
with a comprehensive measure of objective knowledge about the EU and a comprehens-
ive measurement of strength of European identity, we see that cognitive mobilization does
not add substantively to the development of European identity. The economic utilitarian
and political trust model are much better at explaining different levels of European
identity. These findings provide more clarity in how to understand the merits of the theory
of cognitive mobilization on the one hand, and in the relative importance of the cognitive
mobilization theory, economic utilitarian model and political trust model in explaining
strength of European identity on the other hand.
Our analyses oppose different previous studies on cognitive mobilization that do
find strong explanatory power for this theory. This can be explained by the different
operationalization used for cognitive mobilization on the one hand, and by the use of
different dependent variables on the other hand. The study of Díez Medrano and Guittiérez
(2001) on European identity, for instance, found strong support for the theory of cognitive
mobilization. This study, however, operationalized cognitive mobilization not as objective
knowledge, but as reading international news in newspapers. This operationalization rather
measures political interest than knowledge about the EU. Political interest is a control
variable in our analysis and this variable indeed shows a similar result as in the study of
Díez Medrano and Guittiérez (2001). When Inglehart (1970, 54) proposed his theory,
however, he called for the operationalization of cognitive mobilization as objective
knowledge about the EU, so we included such a measurement in our analyses.
When testing the theory of cognitive mobilization, many studies have used support
for European integration as a dependent variable, instead of European identity as the
theory intended to explain (Inglehart 1970, 56). The study of Stoeckel (2012), for
instance, does use objective knowledge to operationalize cognitive mobilization, but it
uses support for European integration as a dependent variable. Combining the results of
Stoeckel and of our own analyses, we thus can conclude that cognitive mobilization –
measured as objective knowledge about the EU – stimulates support for European
integration, but it only weakly stimulates the development of a European identity. This
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shows that while support for European integration and European identity are closely
related, they cannot be treated as the same concept (Beaudonnet and Di Mauro 2012;
Cinnirella 1997; Cram 2012). This is an important finding as often the cognitive
mobilization theory intended to explain European identity is tested using support for
European integration as a dependent variable. A reason for this difference could be found
in the fact that support for European integration is an attitude, while European identity is
an aspect of one’s social identity. The latter concept also has an emotional aspect, in
addition to the cognitive aspect of being conscious about one’s group membership. It
might be speculated that cognitive mobilization taps into the cognitive aspect of European
identity, but not into the emotional aspect.
Furthermore, we found that economic utilitarianism and the political trust model each
can explain a relevant part of the puzzle on the development of European identity. The
hypothesis that knowledge about the EU leads to a stronger European identity, to the
contrary, is only weakly confirmed as the relationship between knowledge about the EU
and European identity is rather weak. A much stronger relationship exists between the
economic indicators and political trust on the one hand and European identity on the
other hand. The more adolescents trust their national political institutions that initiated
the integration of their country into the EU, the more strongly they also feel attached to this
European community. The highest coefficient is found for perceived economic benefits,
which is significantly higher than the coefficient for national political trust. We can thus
conclude from the current test that European identity can be explained by the alternative
models of national political trust and economic benefits. In comparison to the economic
utilitarian and the trust approach, the effect of cognitive mobilization remains very limited.
Additionally, the country-level control variable Euroscepticism highlights the
importance of the general climate in a member state toward European integration. We
find that adolescents that grow up in a member state with a more Eurosceptic climate tend
to develop a weaker European identity than when the climate is more in favor of
European integration. The moment of accession to the EU is not significant on the
country level. These results indicate that it is the attitudinal context that influences the
development of the European identity of adolescents, rather than objective indicators of
membership. The inclusion of this variable even explains 32.3% of the variation in
European identity among adolescents across member states, so this is an important factor
to take into account.
Finally, a number of consequences can be derived from these findings. First, more
knowledge about the functioning of the European institutions only has a limited effect on
European identity. This means that the possibility to strengthen European identity by a
direct transmission of knowledge is limited. If European institutions hope to broaden the
feeling of belonging to the EU by strengthening knowledge about the EU, this analysis
only partly supports this method and most likely effects will be small. While information
on Europe of course is important, one can doubt whether providing information by itself
is a useful way to strengthen European identity in a substantive manner.
Second, having trust in national political institutions is an important explanation for
the development of a stronger European identity. As this relationship between national
political trust and European identity is so strong, it is quite surprising that there has been
little theoretical and empirical research on the relation between political trust and
(European) identity so far. This is thus an important field for further research.
Third, this study might inform us about the question whether the current economic
downturn in Europe could have an impact on the strength of European identity developed
among young European citizens. Media coverage on the euro crisis might have increased
14 S. Verhaegen and M. Hooghe
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [K
U 
Le
uv
en
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
7:3
7 1
8 M
arc
h 2
01
5 
salience of the EU in media and society which might have strengthened the knowledge
adolescents have about the EU, but this also led to more negative attitudes toward the
process of European integration. Coinciding with the euro crisis, the climate in which
adolescents grow up has become more Eurosceptic and adolescents are likely to perceive
membership of the Eurozone as less beneficial. This could be reflected in a weaker
development of European identity than at economically more prosperous moments in the
EU integration process.
To summarize these implications, we see that while knowledge about the EU can be
targeted by school programs and information campaigns, citizens’ trust in political
institutions should be stimulated and citizens should be persuaded about the economic
utility they and their member state enjoy as a result of European integration. However, the
latter strategies are much more difficult to implement than providing information about
the EU, and the sobering conclusion therefore has to be that there might not be an easy
short cut to strengthen levels of European identity among the population of the European
member states.
Notes
1. The research was carried out in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
UK, Spain, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta,
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden. It is important to remark that the national educational
authorities were responsible for financing this research. More precisely this meant for Belgium
that only the Dutch language community participated. The French-speaking community did not
allocate financial resources to participate. In the UK only England participated, not Wales,
Scotland, and Northern Ireland. The Netherlands originally did take part in the study, but the
Dutch research team failed to meet the necessary response rate and therefore the Dutch data are
not included in the data-set and the current analysis.
2. Hooghe and Dassonneville (2011) also included variables that measure how often adolescents
watch or listen to the news broadcast and talk about politics. There appeared to be
multicollinearity between these variables and the variable interest in our model. We keep the
variable interest in our model because this measures more directly respondents’ interest than
when we measure interest more indirectly by looking at media use.
3. The original member states that are included in our sample are Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy.
Between 1973 and 1995 are Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Spain, Sweden, and
England that accessed. The new member states in our sample are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
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Appendix 1. Used knowledge questions from the ICCS 2009 survey
Knowledge about the European Union and its institutions
Are these statements true or false?
. <country of test> is a member of the European Union
. The European Union is an economic and political partnership between countries
. People get new political rights when their country joins the European Union
How many countries are member states of the European Union?
. 1–10
. 11–20
. 21–30
. 31–40
What is the flag of the European Union?
Which of the following cities is a meeting place for the European Parliament?
. Rome
. Berlin
. Paris
. Brussels
Here are some statements about the possible enlargement of the European Union (i.e. the
possibility of more countries joining the European Union). Which of the following
statement is true?
. The European Union has decided not to accept any more countries as new
members
. The European Union may accept more countries in the future but there are
currently no countries being considered as candidates for membership
. The European Union may accept more member countries in the future and is
currently considering granting membership to some specific countries
. The European Union has decided to only accept new member countries if any
existing member countries decide to leave the European Union
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The European Union collects money from member countries to spend on projects. What
determines how much each member country contributes to the European Union?
. The five richest European Union countries contribute all the money
. All European Union countries contribute the same amount of money
. All European Union countries contribute, but the amount depends on how rich
they are
. Each country chooses how much to contribute based on how well they think the
European Union has been using the money
What is one requirement for a country to be allowed to join the European Union?
. The European Union considers it to be a republic
. The European Union considers it to be democratic
. It must be a member of the United Nations <UN>
. It must have a written constitution
Who votes to elect Members of the European Parliament (MEPs)?
. National governments of European Union countries
. Citizens in each European Union country
. Heads of State of European Union countries <(presidents, kings, queens, etc.)>
. The European Commission <(EC)>
Knowledge about European laws and policies
Are these statements true or false?
. The European Union decides what is taught in your school about the European
Union
. The European Union aims to promote peace, prosperity, and freedom within its
borders
. All European Union countries have signed the European Convention on Human
Rights
. The European Union has made laws to reduce pollution
. The European Union pays money to farmers in European Union countries to use
environmentally friendly farming methods
What can all citizens of the European Union do by law?
. Study in any European Union country without needing a special permit
. Travel to any European Union country without needing to carry any identity
documents with them
. Work in any European Union country without needing a special permit
. Vote in the national elections of any European Union country
Are these statements true or false?
. The Euro is the official currency of all countries in Europe
. The Euro is the official currency in European Union countries
. Euro banknotes have the same design in every country where it is the official
currency.
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Appendix 2. Descriptives
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum
European identity 3.068 1 4
Perceived economic benefits 2.951 1 4
Expected educational level 3.095 0 4
Political trust 2.517 1 4
Political interest 2.310 1 5
Parental education 3.431 0 5
Euroscepticism 0.29 0.14 0.52
Variable Proportion
Gender Male: 48.97%
Female: 51.03%
Origin Native: 81.57%
Second generation: 13.05%
Immigrant: 5.39%
Source: ICCS 2009.
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